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Discussion
Raymond F. Hopkins
Department of Political Science
Swarthmore College

D. Gale Johnson has prepared a lucid and persuasive assessment of
the current world food situation. I am flattered that he invited me, a
political scientist, to comment on his paper. I presume from this that
he wanted some controversy; I shall try not to be disappointing, following
the basic premise that more is gained from exploring disagreements
than points of agreement.
Although most of my comments differ from Johnson’s interpretations,
I find myself more in agreement than disagreement with his paper. In
particular, I agree that prospects for food shortages and high prices were
exaggerated during the panic market period of 1973-1975, and they
continue to be exaggerated by some scholars. Furthermore, trends have
been favorable since the 1950s in per capita food production and grain
trade. These facts are unassailable, as is Professor Johnson’s conclusion
that the growth in grain imports during the 1970s is principally attrib
utable to socialist and newly industrializing countries (NICs), not the
poorest developing countries. Finally, I admire the way the paper takes
to task some of the forecasts of tight food supplies by the year 2000.
In addition to the specific points Professor Johnson makes, there is
good reason to be extremely skeptical of such long-range forecasts in
general. More often than not such forecasts prove to be grossly in error,
as studies of past forecasting have shown; policy-makers are well advised
to treat such long-range forecasts with extreme skepticism.* The shift
in focus in the paper to the decade of the 1980s is, I believe, about
right for informed judgment. Regrettably, few policy decisions rest upon
considerations of even this more reasonable future concern; rather, most
policies are driven by something between last year’s conditions and an
eighteen-month forward expectation.
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Let me turn now to some criticisms. There is quite a dark side to
Johnson’s characterization of the last few decades as “things getting
better.” I also disagree with his assessment that demand growth will
be very slow and prices low for the 1980s. I think this forecast will
prove accurate only if the current worldwide recession continues. Finally,
and not surprisingly, I see the role of government intervention into
markets somewhat differently. For me the question is not whether
government intervention is good or bad, but rather how it can be
improved in politically realistic ways.

The Dark Side of the “Things Are
Improving Slowly” Scenario

Professor Johnson argues that in spite of his cautiously optimistic
assessment of factors affecting hunger and undernutrition, “there is no
room for complacency.” This is certainly the case.^ We must be especially
concerned because two trends other than per capita production are
relevant. First, most people compare themselves with one another and
compare their situation to their immediate past rather than with that
of the previous generation. Thus for the 20 to 40 percent of the world’s
populace that are least well fed, a short-term deterioration in their
condition or an awareness of growing disparity between themselves and
better-fed populations might trigger serious economic and political
disturbances. At a minimum, short-term threats to those lacking personal
sources of reserves and resentment over inequality will increase pressure
for governments to intervene in markets through subsidy programs.
Second, many people compare existing food production and distribution
activities with known potential. Professor Johnson himself goes to some
length to assure us that the land, water, transportation, improved
education, and other resources for greater production exist. Is it possible
that we are falling behind in realizing these possibilities? If the ratio
of actual to potential world production and nutrition declines—which
could occur if barriers to innovation and distribution multiply—then
the apparent modest gains must be seen as especially inadequate.
The forecasts seen as cautiously optimistic by Johnson look dangerous
to me. The FAO trend forecast projecting a decrease in undemutrition
from 23 to 17 percent between 1975 and 2000 actually implies an
increase of 100 million additional seriously underfed people.^ The FAO
trends, compared to those of IFPRI or Lester Brown, are the most
promising ones cited. Everyone agrees that much more can and should
be done to improve trend forecasts. The issue is: How bad would things
be if trends persisted because either improvements are not undertaken
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or other countervailing forces arise? The answer is quite bad, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa with its extremely high birth rates.
Africa is the darkest cloud on the food horizon. Professor Johnson
indicated that “Africa had a constant average level of per capita food
production in the 1950s and 1960s and a shocking decline during the
1970s” (p. 8). In his estimate, 1980 per capita production was 15
percent below 1969-1971 levels, though he doubts this figure based on
gains in life expectancy. In any event, compared to Asia and the rest
of the world Africa is the most acute if not the largest problem for the
current world food system.
Others find the African case, now and for the near future, quite grim.
In his ministerial review of food in March 1982, Maurice Williams of
the World Food Council claimed: “Analysis of the African food problem
reveals a steady deterioration in African food production, far outstripped
by population growth. The decline in food production per person was
7 percent in the 1960s accelerating downward with a decline of 15
percent in the 1970s. The outlook for the 1980s is grim, and hunger
and malnutrition during the 1980s can be expected to become far more
widespread.
Our focus is further sharpened by examining wheat trade rather than
grain trade as Professor Johnson does. Most of the wheat traded goes
directly to human consumption, while most coarse grain is used for
feed. The growth in imports for many less-developed countries (LDCs)
was dramatic in wheat; the impact on trade and potential food dependency
is probably greater than the grain figures shown in Johnson’s Table 4
(p. 29) suggest. Sub-Saharan African countries doubled their wheat
imports between 1974/1975 and 1981/1982; their growth was about the
same as the Soviet Union’s and China’s and larger than any other
region’s. Africa, including Egypt, accounted for over 16 percent of wheat
imports in 1980/1981, compared to 4 percent for Eastern Europe, 13
percent for China, and 19 percent for the USSR.* I believe LDCs will
be especially important sources for growth in wheat trade, as well as
grains. Regardless of how Johnson or others divide the LDCs into
various subgroups, such as NICs, oil-exporters, etc. (and I think China
should be included as an LDC), these are the areas of most rapid
urbanization and highest income growth, and hence the major source
for expanded grain trade in the 1980s. I expect Professor Johnson agrees.
Our major differences would be over (1) how tight world markets may
become given no expected growth in Soviet imports, and (2) whether
growth in LDC imports can continue in the 1980s as it did in the
1970s. The answer to both questions, I believe, lies outside the grain
markets. Simply extrapolating population growth, shifts in tastes due
to affluence and urbanization, and various production constraints in
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LDCs suggests strong latent demand. If the current world recession ends
soon—a recession that already may be blamed for the first decline in
U.S. agricultural exports in a decade—I expect LDC demand growth
to surpass that of other importers. Pressure for subsidies should increase,
so that a stable portion of these LDC imports will be subsidized,
especially those for bankrupt countries in Africa and the Middle East.
The Depressed Markets Scenario

This last point leads me to another area of disagreement. Professor
Johnson sees “downward pressure on prices [in world grain markets]
throughout most of the 1980s” (see p. 31). The world food market is
closely related to the world economic situation. Grain prices were
depressed in the 1930s not because of high yields, but thanks primarily
to the world depression; whether trade barriers were the fundamental
or more coincidental cause of this I shall not say. I am confident,
however, that with prices as low as they are today, only great gains in
productive efficiency are saving from bankruptcy those farmers in the
United States and elsewhere whose incomes are tied to world prices.
Neither soil erosion nor water shortages should threaten such gains in
the coming decade. In this longer term with a general recovery in the
international economy, demand will reassert itself. The resources that
can allow production to grow will not be free, however. Longer-term
higher prices for food and water go together in the improved water use
future that Johnson expects, for example. In the near term, government
measures such as setting acreage aside are already combining to lower
production. Hence, I foresee a firming of world prices over the next
year or two and upward pressure in real terms for the last half of the
decade, provided there is a general economic recovery in the Western
world.
Markets and Governments

Weak governments are bad. Most people want strong governments
and want them to intervene in markets, at least in research and innovation
markets or the world nuclear weapons market. Food markets are no
different. People want their government to guard against “excessive”
risk and regulate free riders from capturing “unfair” benefits. Government
intervention into food markets is extensive, lengthy, and not without
bad effects.® Yet I think in his paper Professor Johnson lays too diffuse
a blame on governments for price instability and barriers to production.
Of course, he does not criticize governments generally. He finds that
some public goods provided by governments, such as education, infor-
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mation, roads, and extension services, are desirable. From his writings
I know he has advocated that governments of wealthy countries should
play an insurance role to help stabilize poor countries’ food supplies.
I do not understand, therefore, why the paper lays so much of the blame
for erratic food prices and barriers to production on governments,
particularly government “intervention.” Less government intervention
is not a panacea.
I am not arguing that governments do the right thing even most of
the time. In Africa, bad government policies are certainly to blame for
a great deal of the continent’s food problems.^ The task is to work to
improve the role of government in structuring optimal conditions for
markets to operate in. Probably all observers agree that governments
help food markets by providing information on crop conditions, by
supporting research, by enforcing contracts, including futures contracts,
and so on. Disagreement occurs over how much risk governments should
cover and what mechanisms they should use. It is not clear that the
correlation Professor Johnson finds between greater government regu
lation and price instability for five major traded commodities indicates
a causal relationship. Surely if we found that governments sent more
fire engines to fires that did the greatest damage, we would not blame
the arrival of the fire engines for the losses, nor prescribe their elimination.
There is, in short, usually a good reason for government intervention
into social life, and it usually is motivated by a desire to improve the
life circumstances of people by reducing or sharing risks.
To be fair, I do agree with Professor Johnson that governments can
distort markets. Europe with its common agricultural policy (CAP) and
the Soviet Union with its trading and price policies have extended some
food security and price stability to their populations at a cost of greater
instability in world markets, just as he has argued. It is correct to assign
blame to such government policies that thin the world market in times
of stress as in 1973-1974. These government policies contributed to
international price instability. The answer is to adjust the CAP, however;
to advocate abolishing it is simply not practical. There are other
government intervention policies, national and international, that I
believe make a positive contribution to the performance of world food
markets, especially given the other policies that exist. For example, the
food security for LDCs and the stability of their export demand are
helped by the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan
facility for food imports, by some portion of current food aid programs,
and by commercial loans under banking conditions facilitated by gov
ernments. During the current period of low prices, LDCs might even g|
rationally use U.S. government-secured futures markets to hedge against ^
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future needs and price increases. It would be cheaper than storage in
an LDC reserve system.*
In conclusion, the issue for the 1980s is not whether markets would
better serve the world food economy with less or more government
intervention. Intervention is here to stay. The role of government must
include providing the confidence and rules to create markets and help
them function well in adjusting supply and demand conditions.® In
tervention will also include practices to protect farmers from a prisoner
dilemma type of ruin. When such policies are shaped, however, the
problem becomes one of preventing excessive regulation, distortion,
black markets and so forth on the one hand, and on the other hand
of avoiding an inadequate government role. Domestic protection produces
external effects at the international level, so that weak countries and
producers are faced with either costly policies of self-reliance or excessive
risk and adjustment costs from their exposure to excessively unstable
markets. Politics dictates that before domestic stability or income policies
are altered, however, incentives and assurances will be needed to induce
the alterations. Whether for farmers in Africa or consumers in the
United States, the issue is what kinds of government intervention would
better serve their goals through some balance of efficient production,
equitable distribution and security of supply.

Notes
1. See William Ascher, Forecasting: An Appraisal for Policy Makers and
Planners (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
2. Alan Berg’s book. The Nutrition Factor (Washington: Brookings Institution,
1973), still ranks as one of the best accounts of the social, moral, and economic
debilitations that accompany malnutrition.
3. I derived this estimate using the conservative population estimate of 4
billion in 1975 and 6 billion in 2000 and the FAO figures cited by Johnson
(see p. 7 this book).
4. “Food Policy Issues for the Eighth Session,” Report by the Executive
Director (Rome: World Food Council, 12 March 1982), p. 11. I do not know
why Johnson’s figure for the 1960s in Africa is a modest gain, while Williams’
report indicates there was a 7 percent per capita decline.
5. Food and Agriculture Organization, Food Outlook (Rome: FAO, June 1976
and May 1982).
6. A good critique of government intervention is found in Bruce Gardner,
The Governing of Agriculture (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1981).
7. See, for example, the paper by Robert Bates, “Governments and Agricultural
Markets in Africa,” p. 153 this book.
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8. I am indebted to Anne Peck for convincing me of the soundness of this
use of markets. See Peck, “Futures Markets, Food Imports and Food Security”
(Washington: World Bank Economics and Policy Division, September 1982).
9. See Charles E. Lindblum, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books,
1977).

